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The past few years have seen a plethora of and money laundering initiatives. One of the latest are the so-called 'Global Anti Money Laundering 
Guidelines for Private Banking' formulated at a meeting in 
Wolfsberg, Switzerland ('the Guidelines'). Other initiatives
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have been Government-led. The Guidelines were 
formulated by representatives from the banking industry 
(in collaboration with Transparency International and 
Professor Mark Pieth). The Guidelines were launched on 
29 October 2000. They have received a mixed reception in 
the press. Some have given them a warm welcome saying 
they 'fill a hole left by government regulators'. Others are 
less enthusiastic, dismissing the Guidelines as window 
dressing to reduce public and regulatory pressure on banks 
caught out in a series of embarrassing money laundering 
scandals such as Salinas, Bank of New York and most recently 
Abacha. There is little doubt that such pressure is part of 
the reason for the Guidelines and they seem to have 
generated an impression that banks are facing up to this 
issue, thus reducing pressure.
The other reason for the Guidelines is harmonisation of 
practice for dealing with public officials, particularly from 
high-risk countries (that is countries where there is a high
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risk of crime or corruption). Banks have resisted unilateral 
action, fearing their wealthy clients will switch to 
competitors. It is hoped that other banks will in time sign 
up to the Guidelines. Harmonisation of practices for 
dealing with such clients is important. Success depends on 
the uniform application of the guidelines, which in turn 
depends on the guidelines being free from ambiguity. By 
way of illustration, the requirement in Regulation 9(2) of 
the existing Money Laundering Regulations to take 'reasonable 
measures' to identify a principal for whom an agent is 
acting is thought to create a scope for uncertainty and 
variations in procedures between institutions.
Transparency International's Opening Statement on the 
Guidelines asserts, 'these guidelines are crystal clear. They 
are not ambiguous. They state unequivocally that banks 
agree they should not be used by corrupt crooks'. With 
the greatest respect, the language used in the guidelines is 
not free from ambiguity. For example:
(1) The primary purpose of the guidelines is stated to be 
a commitment to 'accept only those clients whose
source of wealth and funds can be reasonably 
established to be legitimate'.
(2) Banks are required to take 'reasonable measures to 
establish the identity of [their] clients and beneficial
owners .
(3) They must also collect information regarding 'source 
of wealth (description of economic activity which has 
generated the net worth) and estimated net worth'.
Quite what is required of banks is not spelt out and 
references to 'reasonable measures' are obviously capable 
of different interpretation.
The 11 signatories claim the guidelines reflect internal 
best practise. It appears from the US Senate's Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations on Private Banking and
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Money Laundering that those banks whose procedures 
were scrutinised for the purposes of the four case studies 
had detailed procedures. Citibank's Public Figure Policy 
document dated June 1998 runs to four pages. This policy 
document would meet most if not all of the Guidelines. 
But these procedures did not prevent Citibank from 
becoming involved with Abacha's funds. It remains to be 
seen whether the Guidelines will be any more effective.
The Guidelines are a voluntary code. They have no force 
in law and no sanction will apply if they are breached. Press 
reports suggest the 11 banks considered but rejected the 
idea of sanctions for breach.
The Guidelines draw entirely from concepts introduced 
in the existing anti money laundering regimes found in the 
Money Laundering Regulations 1993 and Criminal Justice Act 
1988 (as amended). In essence the Guidelines summarise 
key elements in the Joint Money Laundering Steering 
Group's Guidance Notes. This is not surprising, as the 
JMLSG's Guidance Notes will have informed procedures 
of the 11 signatory banks. Those procedures are 
reportedly considered by Transparency International to be 
'technical and difficult to understand'. It is true that the 
JMLSG's Guidance Notes are technical. Such technicality 
is necessary to address the verification and disclosure 
requirements in a wide range of different situations. The 
danger is that in shunning such a detailed approach, the 
Guidelines will become difficult to implement at the 
coalface. The importance of the Guidelines is that they
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dispel any lingering doubts that the existing anti money 
laundering requirements do not apply to dealings with 
possibly corrupt foreign officials.
The scale of fortunes acquired in recent cases like Abacha 
are so great there can be little scope for resisting the 
inference that they must have been acquired through some 
wrongdoing. A suspicious transaction is defined in the 
JMLSG Guidance Notes to be one, which is 'inconsistent 
with the customer's known legitimate business or personal 
activities'. The size of the transactions involved in such 
cases is so large that, absent an explanation, they were 
clearly inconsistent with the client's 'known legitimate 
business or personal activities' in which case the banks 
were (or at least ought to have been) suspicious. This 
means that all the elements of the offence under section 
93A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (as amended) is 
present. It remains to be seen whether a disclosure report 
was made, giving the bank a defence to criminal liability. 
Of course, such a report would not provide a defence to 
civil liability.
The spate of recent money laundering scandals suggests 
intermediaries in this country have laundered the 
proceeds of foreign corruption. They have led to an
impression that the law is deficient, which has perhaps 
prompted the preparation of the Guidelines. However, this 
impression is incorrect because, as I have mentioned, an 
offence would appear to have been committed. In any 
event, the Guidelines could not remedy any such 
deficiencies; quite apart from the uncertainty of the 
language used, the Guidelines are simply a voluntary code. 
Whilst the existing anti money laundering regime is not 
prefect, its objectives and effect are the same the 
Guidelines. The reason why these objectives and effects 
may not have been fulfilled is because of a failure to 
enforce the law. Both the Serious Fraud Office and the FSA 
have announced that they have initiated investigations into 
banks involved in handling funds on behalf of Abacha and 
this is something that the House of Commons 
International Development Committee is in the process of 
investigating. Hopefully this signals a determination to 
overcome past enforcement deficiencies. @
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Free speech and the 
Human Rights Act 1998
by Paul Kearns
The author considers the practical, constitutional and 
doctrinal implications for freedom of speech in the United 
Kingdom following the coming into force of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 on 2 October 2000.
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The incorporation of most of the articles of the European Convention on Human Rights into English law by the Human Rights Act 1998 has 
involved the quasi-constitutional step of activating a rights- 
based offensive for citizens against die foe of public 
authorities without the fully constitutional step of 
entrenchment. Freedom of expression, including symbolic 
as well as cognitive speech, is arguably the most primary of 
freedoms but it is not as highly prized under the European 
Convention as some suppose. In conflicts between free 
speech and religious lobbies, for example, free speech has
often been compromised by the preferred protection of 
threatened religious precepts, and, in general, the 
legitimate interferences with free speech are relatively 
broad despite the fact that in constitutional terms, in many 
national jurisdictions, freedom of expression is one of the 
most widely accepted rights, on which other rights, such as 
that of freedom of assembly, are frequently parasitic.
As McGoldrick and O'Donnell have lucidly pointed out, 
free speech has a powerful normative status which ensures 
that it generally receives a purposive interpretation, and 
the rationales for that special status have been the search
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